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I.

Introduction

The ministerial exception is a judicially-crafted doctrine based on the First Amendment
and the need to allow religious organizations to select ministers independently.1 It grants these
organizations complete autonomy when it comes to the control of who will minister to the faithful
and has been interpreted to allow religious organizations to hire and fire ministers for any reason. 2
This interpretation of the ministerial exception was solidified in July of 2020 when the Supreme
Court expanded the ministerial exception in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru. 3
The case signaled that the ministerial exception, which had previously been recognized by the
Court in a unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
EEOC,4 is here to stay, with greater immunity granted to religious organizations than ever before.5
The ministerial exception is a relatively new doctrine and was first recognized by the Fifth
Circuit in McClure v. Salvation Army in 1972.6 In Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, the Supreme Court seemed to undercut the ministerial exception, holding that
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires a religious exception to a general law
only if the government’s actions in creating the law can be proved to stem from animus to religion. 7

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., New York University. I would like to thank
Professor Charles Sullivan, Seton Hall Law Review Comments Editor Lauren McNamara, and Seton Hall Law
Review Senior Comments Editor Antonio Vayas for their inciteful comments and incredible feedback. I could not
have done this without them.
1 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2072 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
2 Id.
3 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
4 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
5 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049.
6 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
7 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Lower courts later saved the ministerial exception by shifting the focus of Smith to allow for
churches to control internal affairs, such as selection of ministers.8 Then, in a unanimous 2012
decision, the Supreme Court officially recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC.9 The decision clarified that the ministerial
exception is an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar, but left many open questions,
including: how to determine which organizations can use a ministerial exception and how to define
a minister.10
Most recently, in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the Court expanded
the ministerial exception to apply to any employee of a religious organization charged with the
formation of religion in the mind of believers.11 The majority in this decision again declined to
adopt a “rigid formula” for determining who is a minister and stated that it was only deciding the
“case before [it].”12
After the ruling, some scholars worried that Guadalupe’s expansion of the ministerial
exception allowed for a greater number of employees to be exempt from nondiscrimination
protections.13 While the Court may have expanded these protections in cases like Bostock v.
Clayton County, which held that employees could not be discriminated against because of their
sexual orientation or gender identity,14 Guadalupe signaled that these protections may be

Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law – the Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination
Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1970 (2007) (“The ministerial exception survives Smith primarily because lower
courts claim there is a distinct constitutional right of church autonomy in internal ecclesiastical affairs.”).
9 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171.
10 See Id.
11 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020).
12 Id. at 2069.
13 See, e.g., Mark Walsh, Supreme Court Narrows Employment Protections for Parochial School Teachers,
EDUCATION WEEK (July 8, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/education/supreme-court-narrows-employmentprotections-for-parochial-school-teachers/2020/07 (“The ministerial exception is meant to apply only to genuine
faith leaders . . . . It should not be exploited to justify discrimination against math, gym, and computer teachers, who
clearly aren’t ministers.”); see also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2082 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the decision would impact nonclerical employees at religious organizations).
14 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
8
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temporary or illusory for many employees. 15 These are valid concerns, but there is still a route
that courts can take to narrow the ministerial exception: by not applying it to situations involving
treatment of employees where hiring or firing is not involved.
The two Supreme Court cases relating to the ministerial exception, Guadalupe and
Hosanna-Tabor, dealt specifically with the firing of employees at religiously-affiliated schools
and not with the treatment of employees during their tenure at these schools.16 In other words, the
Court in both cases held that the ministerial exception allowed religious schools to fire an
employee deemed to be a “minister” for any reason in order to ensure that schools have sole
discretion to determine who will minister to the faithful. 17 But these rulings did not directly
address whether the exception applies to the treatment of employees during their tenure at the
organization.18
The idea that the treatment of employees during their tenure at religious organizations may
not fall under the ministerial exception is evidenced by the circuit court split relating to whether
ministers at religious organizations can bring suits relating to their treatment while employed. For
example, the Ninth Circuit held that while an employee’s claims relating to her hiring and firing
were foreclosed, she could bring claims relating to a hostile work environment .19

But in

Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, the Tenth Circuit articulated that a minister could not bring

15

See Erwin Chermerinsky & Howard Gilman, The Weaponization of the Free-Exercise Clause, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/weaponization -free-exercise-clause/616373/;
Sharita Gruberg, Beyond Bostock: The Future of LGBTQ Civil Rights, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 26, 2020,
9:01 AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/weaponization -free-exercise-clause/616373/.
16 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
17 Id. In Our Lady of Guadalupe and Hosanna-Tabor, the employees in question were teachers at religious schools
and did not hold the title of “minister.” Id.
18 Id.
19 Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Title VII or Equal Pay Act claims against a church because the claims would interfere with the
church’s right to select and direct its ministers. 20
Following the Court’s decision in Guadalupe, many have expressed worry that the
ministerial exception could be interpreted as allowing religious employers to avoid discrimination
laws entirely, without any judicial recourse for harmed employees.21 Justice Soyomayor’s dissent
reflected this worry when she expressed concern about the Court’s shift in application of the
ministerial exception from a factor-based approach to a “rubber stamp” of employment decisions
made by religious employers.22 While authors have explored how harassment cases should be
treated by the court,23 this Comment will explore the potential application of the ministerial
exception to federal and state laws regulating working conditions, such as the FMLA, state sick
leave laws, and pregnancy accommodations. Ultimately, it urges the Court to use forthcoming
cases stemming from these laws to limit the ministerial exception to cases dealing with the hiring
and firing of ministerial employees.
Part II will explore the history of the ministerial exception by focusing on the Supreme
Court’s rulings and interpretation. Part III will discuss the ministerial exception in relation to the
treatment of employees and the split in circuit court decisions relating to cases of employee

20

Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010).
See Erwin Chermerinsky & Howard Gilman, The Weaponization of the Free-Exercise Clause, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/weaponization -free-exercise-clause/616373/;
Sharita Gruberg, Beyond Bostock: The Future of LGBTQ Civil Rights, CTR, FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 26, 2020,
9:01 AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/weaponization-free-exercise-clause/616373/. But see
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The 2020 Ministerial Exception Cases: A Clarification, Not a Revolution , TAKE
CARE (July 8, 2020) https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-2020-ministerial-exception-cases-a-clarification-not-arevolution (arguing that the Guadalupe decision does not give religious organizations immunity from secular laws,
but rather protects their ability to make internal management decisions that impact their central mission without
government interference).
22 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2076 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
23 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, #Metoo Meets the Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment Claims by
Clergy and the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, 25 WM. & M ARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 249 (2019);
Jared S. Gonzalez, At the Intersection of Religious Organization Missions and Employment Laws: The Case of
Minister Employment Suits, 65 CATH. U.L. REV. 303 (2015).
21
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treatment at religious institutions. Part IV will explore areas of law that provide an opportunity to
limit the ministerial exception: specifically, federal and state laws regulating working conditions.
Such laws include the Family and Medical Leave Act, pregnancy accommodation and leave, and
state sick leave laws, to show that the ministerial exception does not have to apply to these laws.
Part V will conclude and urge the Court to use forthcoming cases stemming from laws relating to
employee treatment to narrow the ministerial exception.
II.

The History of the Ministerial Exception

The ministerial exception is constitutionally based, but prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hosanna-Tabor, scholars and courts disagreed as to its constitutional basis. Some
argued that the ministerial exception is grounded in the Establishment Clause.24

The

Establishment Clause refers to part of the First Amendment that reads: “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”25 Other scholars argued that the ministerial
exception was grounded in the Free Exercise Clause,26 which directly follows the Establishment
Clause and reads “or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”27 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court
cleared up the confusion by explicitly stating that the ministerial exception was rooted in both
clauses.28
The ministerial exception, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor and
Guadalupe, is primarily focused on allowing religious organizations to autonomously determine

24

See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789
(2004).
25 U.S. C ONST . amend. I (emphasis added).
26 See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith , 2004 BYU
L. REV. 1633 (2004).
27 U.S. C ONST . amend. I (emphasis added).
28 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 184 (“The Establishment Clause
prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with
the freedom of religious groups to select their own.”).
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who will “personify [its] beliefs,” and protects a religious group’s right to “shape its own mission
through its appointments.”29
The Court’s carefully crafted wording in the only two ministerial exception cases it has
encountered suggests that this exception is limited to decisions related to the hiring and firing of
ministers, and therefore, may not apply to the treatment of employees.30 This is because the
treatment of employees is not related to decisions about who will serve as a minister—presumably,
once a minister is hired, that decision has already been made. And because the treatment occurs
during employment, termination would not be applicable.
Because the ministerial exception is a judicially-crafted doctrine, it contains ample
nuance, therefore before exploring this argument further, one must start from the beginning in
order to gain a strong understanding. Thus, in this section, Part A will discuss the creation of the
ministerial exception in the lower courts, and Part B will explore the Supreme Court’s
acceptance and interpretation of the ministerial exception.
A. The Creation of the Ministerial Exception
Prior to the Supreme Court’s recognition of the ministerial exception, lower courts
looked to a line of Supreme Court decisions, which courts perceived to have common thread
because “throughout these opinions there exist[ed] ‘a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide
for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine.’”31

29

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added).
In Hosanna-Tabor, for example, the Court did not consider any other type of actions that might be brought by a
minister against a religious institution, and was careful to use language that limited its decision to the government
inability to “contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.” Id.at 185.
31 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344
U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Archb ishop, 280 U.S. 1
(1929); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
30
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McClure v. Salvation Army was the first case to recognize the ministerial exception.32
McClure, and many early cases, focused primarily on the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.33
Millie M. McClure was an ordained minister in the Salvation Army and sued her employer
for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.34 McClure claimed that she was paid less than her
male counterparts, did not receive benefits equal to those of her male colleagues, and that she was
dismissed in retaliation for her complaints about this to her superiors and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.35
The court was tasked with deciding whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
“applie[d] to the employment relationship between a church and its ministers and, if applicable,
whether the statute impinge[d] upon the religion clauses of the First Amendment.”36 The Salvation
Army did not dispute McClure’s account, but claimed that application of Title VII under t he
circumstances McClure presented would be a violation of the First Amendment because it was a
church.37 This was the first time a court considered “whether Title VII’s statutory religious
institution exemption applied to non-religious as well as religiously-based employment
discrimination.”38

32

McClure, 460 F.2d 553.
See McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (“[A]pplication of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship
existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister would result in an encroachment
by the State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.”).
34 Id. at 555.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 554–55.
37 Id. at 556.
38 Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the Constitutional
Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481, 497 (2001).
33
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The court looked to the question of whether the application of Title VII to McClure’s
claims would violate the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause.39 The court’s analysis seemed to
rest on the doctrine of religious autonomy.40 The court recognized that the “relationship between
an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood . . . [a] minister is the chief instrument by
which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose,” and that “[j]ust as the initial function of selecting a
minister is a matter of church administration and government, so are the functions which
accompany such a selection.”41
Ultimately, the court held that applying Title VII to the relationship between McClure and
the Salvation Army would be an unlawful encroachment by the State on the First Amendment and
dismissed the minister’s claim.42 The court determined that Congress did not “intend through the
non-specific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII to regulate the employment
relationship between church and minister.”43 This wording is credited as the first recognition of
the “ministerial exception.”44
Thirteen years after McClure, the Fourth Circuit in Rayburn v. General Conference of
Seventh Day Adventists constitutionalized the exception.45 In Rayburn, a woman sued the church
under Title VII, claiming she was rejected from a pastoral position because of her “sex, association

39

McClure, 460 F.2d at 558.
Id. (“The Supreme Court has many times recognized that the First Amendment has built a ‘wall of separation’
between church and State.”).
41 Id. at 559.
42 The Court Examined §702 of the Civil Rights Act, which gives some employment relations an exemption from
Title VII protections. Id. at 558. McClure argued that the exemptions allowed religious organizations to only
discriminate based on religion. Id. The court agreed that the legislative history supported this argument. Id. (“The
language and legislative history of §702 compel the conclusion that Congress did not intend that a religious
organization be exempted from liability for discriminating against its employees on the basis of race, color, sex or
national origin with respect to their compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”).
43 Id. at 560–61.
44 See Brief for Judicial Watch, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Our La dy of Guadalupe Sch. v.
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (Nos. 19–267 & 19–348).
45 Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The ‘ministerial
exception’ to Title VII first articulated in McClure v. Salvation Army . . .”).
40
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with black persons, . . . and opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII.” 46 The Fourth
Circuit stated that churches were not “above the law,” and could therefore be held liable for torts
and breaches of contracts when the “decision does not involve the church’s spiritual function.”47
When the decision does involve the church’s spiritual function, though, the court explained that
applying Title VII would create too close a relationship between the church and state, and that
“state scrutiny of the church’s choice would infringe substantially on the church’s free exercise of
religion and would constitute impermissible government entanglement with the church
authority.”48
This ruling was soon cast into doubt. Prior to Employment Division v. Smith, laws that
substantially burdened the practice of religion were examined under strict scrutiny and violated
the Free Exercise Clause unless the state was able to show a compelling state interest. 49 In Smith,
however, the Supreme Court weakened Free Exercise Clause protection.50
In Smith, two individuals were terminated from their positions at a private drug
rehabilitation facility due to work-related “misconduct.”51 That misconduct involved the ingestion
of the drug peyote for sacramental purposes as part of a religious practice at the Native American
Church.52 The intentional possession of a controlled substance, such as peyote, was illegal under
Oregon law.53 When the individuals later tried to file for unemployment compensation, they were
denied by the Employment Division of the Department of Human Resources of Oregon because
the law did not allow employees that had been discharged for misconduct to collect

46

Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1171.
48 Id. at 1164, 1170.
49 Corbin, supra, note 8, at 1969.
50 Id.
51 Employ’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 875.
47
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unemployment.54 The individuals claimed this was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause because
it interfered with their ability to practice religion. 55
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the Free Exercise Clause required
courts to grant exception to religious actions that were in contradiction to an otherwise valid law,
and held that the Free Exercise Clause could not be utilized to challenge neutral laws of general
applicability.56 The Court also distinguished Smith from past Free Exercise Clause cases by stating
that those cases had dealt with free exercise in combination with other constitutional protections,
but in Smith, the Court was dealing with a free exercise claim on its own. 57
Following this decision, lower courts nevertheless retained the ministerial exception by
reasoning that the Court did not intend its holding to interfere with previous decisions relating to
non-intervention in matters between a church and its personnel. 58 In other words, Smith was
interpreted not as dismissing the ministerial exception, but rather as dealing only with an
individual’s ability to practice religion, leaving intact the church’s autonomous ability to select its
ministers.59
B. The Supreme Court and the Ministerial Exception

54

Id. at 874.
Id.
56 Id. at 890.
57 Employ’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
58 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes between Religious Institutions
and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 130–31 (2009); see also Charles A. Sullivan, Contents: Clergy
Contracts, 22. EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 371, 382–83 (2018) (“[A]fter Smith some doubted the continued
viability of the ministerial exception, but the circuit courts quickly put to rest any such debate by recasting the
exception as predicated . . . [by a] line of authority that the lower courts read as immunizing churches from
governmental interference in their internal governance”); Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Civil Procedure and
the Ministerial Exception, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1847, 1854 (2018) (Following Smith, “some commentators
questioned whether the ministerial exception should survive. The D.C. Circuit, however, squarely held that Smith
had no impact on the availability of the exception”).
59 See Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1 299, 1302–04 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The Smith
decision focused on the first type of government infringement on the right of free exercise of religion —infringement
on an individual’s ability to observe the practices of his or her religion. The second type of go vernmental
infringement—interference with a church’s ability to select and manage its own clergy —was not at issue in
Smith.”).
55
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The Supreme Court first recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.60 At the time of this decision, all of the United
States Circuit Courts had accepted the ministerial exception. 61 The Court’s unanimous decision
signaled that the ministerial exception would be a permanent addition to the rule of law in the
United States.62 This case dealt with whether a religious organization’s freedom to select its
ministers was “implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment.” 63
Hosanna-Tabor involved plaintiff Cheryl Perich, a “called” teacher at Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School.64 “Called” teachers were those “regarded as having
been called to their vocation by God through a congregation.” 65 Perich taught at the school for
several years and became ill with what was later determined to be narcolepsy during her
employment.66

She began the 2004-2005 academic year on disability leave, but when she

informed the school that she would be able to return in January of 2005, the school stated that it
did not believe she was ready to return. 67
The congregation voted to offer Perich a “peaceful release” from her employment, but
when she refused to resign the school told her it no longer had a position for her. 68 Perich was
eventually fired for “insubordination and disruptive behavior,” and for threatening to take legal
action against the school.69

Perich filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity

60 Hosanna -Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
61 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, SECULAR GOVERNMENT R ELIGIOUS PEOPLE 57 (2014).
62

See Brian M. Murray, A Tale of Two Inquiries: The Ministerial Exception after Hosanna -Tabor, 68 SMU L. REV.
1124, 1125 (2015).
63 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.
64 Id. at 168.
65 Id. at 176.
66 Id. at 178.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 179.
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Commission (EEOC), arguing that she was fired in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.70 The EEOC then sued the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School.71
Hosanna-Tabor claimed that it fired Perich because her “threats to sue the Church violated
the Synod’s belief that Christians should resolve their disputes internally,” and that the First
Amednment barred her suit.72
The Court agreed with the school, and for the first time acknowledged the ministerial
exception when it stated, “[w]e agree that there is such a ministerial exception,” and ruled that
Perich was a minister for the purposes of the exception, and therefore the government had no
ability to intervene in the school’s decision.73 In doing so, however, the Court refused to create a
“rigid formula” for determining when an employee would qualify as a minister.74 Instead, the
Court focused only on the facts in front of it, and concluded that given the circumstances
surrounding Perich’s employment, she qualified as a minister. 75 And as “both Religious [Free
Exercise and Establishment] Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a
religious group to fire one of its ministers,” the Court could not intervene.

76

The Court distinguished Hosanna-Tabor from Smith by stating that “Smith involved
government regulation of only outwardly physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns
government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the

70

Id.
Id. at 179-180.
72 Id. at 180.
73 Id. at 188, 181.
74 Id. at 190.
75
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–192.
76 Id. at 181. Some argued following the Hosanna-Tabor decision that the Court’s reasoning was more centered on
the Establishment Clause than the Free Exercise Clause, because the Establishment Clause relies on the
government’s carving out of specific areas to be beyond government control. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1266, 1280 (2017).
71
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church itself.”77 Rather than focusing on precedential cases relating to the Free Exercise Clause,
the Court focused on prior cases involving church property disputes that held that courts must defer
to church decisions in matters of religious doctrine and that it “must respect the decisions of
religious authorities on ecclesiastical questions.”78 This line of cases held that the church was
barred from contradicting “a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.” 79
The Court also articulated that the government has no power to determine who “will
minister to the faithful,” and that any such interference would violate the Establishment Clause.80
The Establishment Clause, the Court reasoned, therefore forbids the government from appointing
ministers.81 The Court did not take into account the reasoning behind Perich’s firing because it
did not matter; according to the Establishment Clause, if a person qualifies as a minister and is
fired for any reason, the Court has no ability to interfere with this decision.82
The Court also determined that it would not have been able to grant the monetary relief
Perich was seeking because that would effectively serve to punish the church for termination of a
minister, which would also be prohibited by the First Amendment.83 In recognizing the ministerial
exception for the first time, the Court was careful to “express no views on whether the exception
bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious
conduct by their religious employers.”84

77

Hosanna -Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 76, at 1274.
79 Hosanna -Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185.
80 Id. at 195.
81 Id. at 184.
82 See Lupu & Tutle, supra note 78, 1283.
83 Id. at 194. Perich was seeking “backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.”
84 Id. at 196. The Court did clear up one question related to the ministerial exceptio n, though, when it concluded that
the exception was an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar. Id at 195, n.4. The court explained that this
was because the issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief they seek, not whether a court is able to hear the
case. Id. This gave district courts the power to adjudicate ministerial exception cases, and gave courts discretion to
determine whether a case can proceed, or is barred by the ministerial exception. Without clearer guidelines to
determine who is or is not a minister, however, this has led to some confusion among lower courts when trying to
decide whether or not to apply the ministerial exception. See supra, part III.
78
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Hosanna-Tabor was careful to use language that limited its decision to the government’s
inability to “contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.” 85 This focus
suggests that the ministerial exception applies only to the hiring and firing of ministers, and not
the treatment of employees during their tenure at the organization.
While the Court’s affirmation of the ministerial exception was decisive, it also left several
open questions in addition to how to determine who is or is not a minister. For example, the opinion
did not clarify what type of religious organization can have a minister and used terms such as
“church,” “religious group,” “religious organization,” and “religious employer” interchangeably. 86
This means that there is no way to know or estimate how many individuals fall under the
ministerial exception at any one time, and ministers have been found to exist in areas that have
religious affiliations but are not exclusively religious, such as hospitals.87 This is an ambiguity the
Court must clarify in a future case.
Hosanna-Tabor also featured two concurrences. One, authored by Justice Alito, and joined
by Justice Kagan, signaled the jurisprudence that was to come when Justice Alito wrote: “courts
should focus on the function performed by persons who work for religious bodies” when
determining whether the ministerial exception applies. 88 This is because the Constitution protects
freedom of religion for all religions, many of which do not have the same type of ordination as
Christian denominations, but must still be free to “choose the personnel who are essential to the
performance” of key religious activities. 89 Justice Thomas also authored a concurrence and argued
that the religion clauses of the First Amendment require courts to defer to religious organizations’

85

Id. at 185.
See Murray, supra note 62, at 1132 n. 61 (noting that “the court uses ‘church’ over forty times, religious group
seven times, religious organization seven times, religious institution one time, and religious employer t wo times.”);
see also Zoe Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181 (2014).
87 Id. at 1142.
88 Hosanna -Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 198 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 711–12.
86
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ministerial designations and that any attempt by courts to decide who qualifies as a minister is
impermissible.90
But most importantly, by focusing on the exception’s importance to the selection of
ministers and a religious organization’s autonomy to decide who will serve as ministers to the
faithful through its hiring and firing of individuals, the Court left open the possibility that the
exception does not apply in other cases: namely those dealing with treatment of employees during
their tenure.91 As noted, the Court specifically stated that it was not expressing any views on
whether the exception would apply to suits “including actions by employees alleging breach of
contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.” 92
In July of 2020, the Supreme Court expanded the ministerial exception in Our Lady of
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru to apply to any employee of a religious organization
charged with the formation of the religion on the mind of parishioners. 93 For many, this expansion
was cause for alarm, as it seemed to signal that the Court was paving the way to allow religious
employers to avoid discrimination laws without having to provide religious reasons for doing so.94
The Guadalupe court also made it clear that there was no test or oversight that the judicial system
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Id. at 710–11 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Hosanna -Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. The Court stated that an intrusion on a church’s decision to hire or fire an
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92 Id. at 196.
93 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049 (2020).
94 See Erwin Chermerinsky & Howard Gilman, The Weaponization of the Free-Exercise Clause, THE ATLANTIC
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could provide for these decisions, which, according to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, provided a
“rubber stamp” for these decisions.95
Guadalupe consisted of two combined lower court cases, one brought by Agnes MorriseyBerru against her former employer, Our Lady of Guadalupe, and the other brought by Kristen Biel
against her former employer, St. James School.96
In analyzing the case, the Court took extensive pains to d iscuss Morrisey-Berru’s (as well
as later Biel’s) job functions. Morrisey-Berru was employed as a lay teacher at Our Lady of
Guadalupe and taught all subjects.97

Part of the school’s stated mission was to promote

Catholicism, and Morrisey-Berru’s employment contract stated that all her duties were focused on
this mission.98 Morrisey-Berru taught religion, directed the yearly student passion play, helped
students prepare for Mass, started class with a Hail Mary, led prayer with students, and was
reviewed using a religious standard.99 Because the curriculum involved the teaching of religion,
the Court deemed her to be “her students’ religion teacher.” 100
Morrisey-Berru brought her claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 because she stated that the school had demoted and then fired her because of her age. 101 The
school disputed this and claimed she was fired due to her inability to adopt to a new learning
program.102 The school claimed that its actions fell under the ministerial exception, but the Ninth
Circuit disagreed, stating that, even though Morrissey-Berru had many religious duties, those
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duties alone were not enough to qualify for the ministerial exception under the framework provided
by Hosanna-Tabor.103
In Biel’s case, Biel worked as a lay teacher at a Catholic primary school and taught every
subject, including religion.104 Like Morrisey-Berru she taught Catholicism, gave tests on religion
every week, prayed with students every day, and was evaluated on religious criteria.105 Biel sued
the school under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that she was fired because
she had requested a leave of absence due to her need for medical care relating to her breast cancer
diagnosis.106 In Biel’s case, the Ninth Circuit again held that Biel did not have a religious
background or training, as Perich had in the Hosanna-Tabor case, and was not a minister.107
While the Court referred to the analysis outlined in Hosanna-Tabor to determine whether
Morrisey-Berru and Biel were ministers, it expanded application of the ministerial exception by
acknowledging that the significance of the factors it highlighted in Hosanna-Tabor were not
necessary to create a ministerial exception.108 In other words, the presence or absence of the title
“minister” is not dispositive. The Court held that “what matters, at bottom, is what an employee

Morrisey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem).
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2058.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018). In both Biel and Morrisey-Berru, the Ninth Circuit claimed
to look at the totality of the roles the women played within their schools, but downplayed the importance their
religious teaching played in the formation of the religion in the students’ minds. Id.; Morrisey-Berru v. Our Lady of
Guadalupe Sch., 769 Fed.Appx. 460 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem). Instead, the court chose to focus on the other factors
that were considered in Hosanna-Tabor, including the fa ct that the teachers did not have as much training as Perich
and did not hold themselves out as ministers, in order to find that the ministerial exception did not apply to either of
them. Id.
108 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S.Ct. at 2063.
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does,”109 and declined to adopt a rigid structure to determine who is or is not a minister, stating
that it was enough to decide “the case before [it].” 110
The Court examined the importance of religious education in different religions and found
it to be universally important,111 and that educating youth in religious doctrine “lie[s] at the very
core of the mission of a private religious school.”112 The Court then reasoned that, since both of
these schools deemed teachers to play a vital role in the church’s mission, and courts cannot
second-guess such decisions, in both cases the ministerial exception applied. 113 It explained that,
even though the ADA and Title VII have provisions allowing religious employers to “give
preference to members of a particular faith in employing individuals to do work connected with
their activities . . .” the exception noted in Hosanna-Tabor serves a different focus; it allows the
institution to dismiss a minister that is not “performing essential functions in a satisfactory
manner.”114 So because the religious organizations were schools that deemed teachers to be central
to the schools’ missions, the schools could fire teachers (or “ministers”) for any reason, even if the
termination would otherwise be a violation of discrimination laws. 115
The Court held that the First Amendment’s religion clauses prohibit interference with
religious institutions’ decisions relating to faith and doctrine. 116 The Court explained that the
independence of these matters were of the utmost importance to religious institutions because it

Id. at 2064. This holding shows a shift in the thinking of the Court toward Justice Alito’s concurrence from
Hosanna-Tabor, which stressed that when determining whether the ministerial exception applies, the focus should
be on the employee’s function within the religious organization. Hosanna -Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 198 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
110 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S.Ct. at 2069.
111 Id. at 2065.
112 Id. at 2064.
113 Id. at 2066.
114 Id. at 2068.
115 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S.Ct. at 2068.
116 Id. at 2060.
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allowed institutions to remain autonomous with respect to “internal management decisions that are
essential to the institution’s central mission.”117
This does not mean, however, that these institutions are immune from all secular laws.118
Rather, a part of the autonomy granted to religious institutions is the freedom to select the people
who will perform certain key roles within their organization.119 This reinforces the decision and
analysis in Hosanna-Tabor, where the Court stated that “depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs” would constitute unacceptable judicial
interference into a religious organization’s internal governance. 120 In other words, the church
should have full control to “shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.”121
Unlike Hosanna-Tabor, however, Guadalupe was not a unanimous decision and included
a strongly-worded dissent authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justice Ginsburg. 122 The
dissent objected to the teachers being labeled as “ministers” because they did not have the correct
background, training, or functions to qualify as ministers.123 The dissent noted that leadership was
central to the Hosanna-Tabor decision, and was essential to the previous circuit cases before
Hosanna-Tabor.124 Without a leadership qualification, the dissent argued, the decision “invites
the ‘potential for abuse’” and expanded the ministerial exception as broadly as it could – ignoring
statutory exceptions that already existed in favor of a judicially-created doctrine.125
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But the failure to create a framework to determine who is a minister was not the only
question the Court left open.126 The Court also failed to answer whether the ministerial exception
is applicable only to the hiring and firing of ministers at these religious organizations, or if it
applies to the treatment of employees during their time at the organization.
Again, the careful wording of the Court in Guadalupe suggests that the ministerial
exception applies only to hiring and firing, or the “selection” of persons playing key roles within
the organization.127 And as in Hosanna-Tabor, the Guadalupe court stated that it was only
deciding the “case before it,” and therefore, language that may appear to imply that the ministerial
exception could apply in cases outside of the selection of ministers is by no means dispositive.128
This opening is an opportunity for the Court to narrow the ministerial exception in a meaningful
way.
The ministerial exception is a judicially crafted doctrine. 129 Judicial interpretation has
shifted from the Free Exercise Clause focused application in McClure to the combined Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause interpretation certified by the Supreme Court in HosannaTabor and reiterated in Guadalupe. As the Court continues to shape the ministerial exception and
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The Court once again failed to define exactly which organizations the ministerial exception applies to and again
used terms like “religious organization,” “religious institution,” and “church” seemingly interchangeably. Our Lady
of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
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clarify the ambiguities mentioned above, it can take advantage of opportunities relating to
ministerial treatment to narrow the ministerial exception in a way that will allow for greater
employee protections while safeguarding religious institutions’ First Amendment rights.

III.

The Ministerial Exception and Employee Treatment

The cases discussed above explicitly hold that the ministerial exception applies to hiring
and firing by stating that religious institutions should be free to autonomously “select” ministers.
Therefore, religious institutions can use the exception as an affirmative defense to all claims
relating to employment decisions that are central to the institutions’ missions. But, this same
reasoning does not necessarily apply to cases dealing with treatment of employees, as employee
treatment is not relevant to the selection of who conveys the faith.
In Guadalupe, the Court explained that the Religion Clauses protect religious institutions’
rights to decide issues “‘of faith and doctrine’ without government intrusion,” and that
governmental intrusion in such matters was prohibited by the First Amendment. 130 The Court
noted that the independence of these issues was linked to independence in matters of church
government, but churches are not immune from secular laws. 131

Religious institutions do,

however, have autonomy when it comes to “internal management decisions that are essential to
the institution’s central mission” which includes “selection of the individuals who play certain key
roles.”132

The Court noted that the ministerial exception maintains religious institutions’

independent authority to “select, supervise, and if necessary, remove a minister” to ensure that “a
wayward minister’s preaching, teaching, and counseling” do not “lead the congregation away from
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the faith.”133 In both Hosanna-Tabor and Guadalupe, the Court had the opportunity to declare
that the ministerial exception applies to situations outside of ensuring control over the message
ministers preach to the faithful, but in both cases the Court focused on this reason alone. Because
the treatment of ministers during their employment does not relate to a church’s ability to control
the message being preached to the faithful, and churches would presumably have already selected
a minister for this purpose (or could fire them if they were not performing satisfactorily), suits
relating to employee treatment should fall outside of the ministerial exception.
The circuit courts are split on this issue and whether the ministerial exception applies to
cases that do not involve the hiring or firing of ministers but rather relate to ministerial treatment.134
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits believe that these cases are permissible and do not invoke the
ministerial exception, while the Tenth Circuit would apply the ministerial exception.135 First, this
Comment will discuss the reasons Circuit Courts have found that the ministerial exception does
not apply to employee treatment by exploring the Ninth Circuit case Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian
Church, andthe Seventh Circuit case Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish.

It will then

examine the Tenth Circuit’s explanation for why the ministerial exception should apply to
treatment as outlined in Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese.
A. Circuit Split: Ministerial Exception Does Not Apply to Cases Involving Employee
Treatment
The Ninth Circuits has held that employees are able to bring employment suits for actions
taken by a religious institution that deal with the treatment of an employee during their
employment so long as the claim does not relate to the hiring or firing of the employee.136 The
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Compare Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004). with Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath.
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Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in a decision that has since been vacated and is
awaiting rehearing en banc.

137

Even though this case is no longer precedential, the court’s

reasoning and still worth analyzing when considering employee treatment and the ministerial
ministerial exception analysis and will be discussed.
1.

Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church138

Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church was decided prior to Hosanna-Tabor and Guadalupe
and upheld the ministerial exception in relation to adverse actions taken by a church against a
ministerial employee.139 The plaintiff, though, was allowed to bring suit for sexual harassment
she suffered during her tenure as long as the remedies were limited to tort-type damages and
excluded reinstatement or damages for lost wages. 140
Monica McDowell Elvig was an ordained minister and the Calvin Presbyterian Church
hired her as an Associate Pastor.141 A Senior Pastor began to sexually harass Elvig, creating a
hostile work environment; Elvig complained to the church, which investigated but ultimately did
nothing.142 The Senior Pastor’s harassment got worse after Elvig complained to the EEOC, and
the church put her on unpaid leave and ultimately fired her.143
Elvig brought claims against the church and her supervisor for violations of Title VII due
to the sexual harassment she suffered, as well as state law claims for “defamation, negligent
supervision and violations of the Washington Law Against Discrimination.”144 The Ninth Circuit
held that plaintiff’s claims against the church that related to hiring and firing were foreclosed by
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the ministerial exception but that she was able to bring her claims relating to hostile work
environment.145 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning centered on the idea that claims could be brought
if the church did not claim “doctrinal reasons for tolerating or failing to stop the sexual
harassment.”146
The court also determined that she was able to hold the church vicariously liable for the
harassment “unless the Church [could] satisfy the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.”147 The
plaintiff’s claims for retaliatory harassment could also move forward because the harassment
alleged (verbal abuse and harassment), was not a protected employment decision, although the
court acknowledged that employer could be protected from Title VII liability by the First
Amendment if it claimed the retaliatory actions were doctrinal. 148
After this case, the church petitioned for review en banc, which was denied.149 The
decision to deny did contain a dissent, however, authored by Judge Kleinfeld, who argued that
supervision of clergy should also fall under the ministerial exception because it is as important as
decisions relating to hiring and firing of ministers. 150

1. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish
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The most recent case dealing with the ministerial exception, Demkovich v. St. Andrew the
Apostle Parish, was decided after Guadalupe. 151 Although this decision was vacated in December
of 2020 to allow for a rehearing en banc, and therefore holds no precedential value, the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning is still useful in analyzing the application of the ministerial exception to
employee treatment.152 Here, in a 2-1 panel decision, the Seventh Circuit determined that a
homosexual worker could bring harassment claims against his religious employer for the harms he
suffered during his employment. 153
The plaintiff, Sandor Demkovich, was gay and was hired by St. Andrew the Apostle Parish
as its music director but fired two years later.154 At the time he was hired, he was dating his future
husband and suffered from obesity, diabetes and metabolic syndrome.

155

During his employment,

Demkovich’s supervisor engaged in verbal attacks related to Demkovich’s sexual orientation and
disabilities, which created a hostile work environment. 156 As Demkovich’s wedding grew closer,
the attacks became more common and increasingly harsh. 157
After Demkovich’s wedding, his supervisor demanded that he resign, and fired
Demkovich when he refused.158 Demkovich sued, alleging hostile work environment claims under
Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).159 Both parties agreed that Demkovich
was a minister within the definition of Hosanna-Tabor and Guadalupe.160 The lower court
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certified the question of whether the ministerial exception bars all ADA and Title VII claims
brought by ministers even if the claim does not involve tangible employment actions.161 Tangible
employment actions have been defined as “a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits.”162 The court also assumed that the “plaintiff
would be able to establish a basis for employer liability under Title VII and the ADA,”163 and the
parties agreed that the supervisor’s conduct was “motivated by his and the Church’s religious
beliefs.”164
Demkovich’s majority opinion started with a quote from Guadalupe and explicitly stated
that the Supreme Court’s decision in that case, as well as Hosanna-Tabor, did not allow federal
employment discrimination laws to be enforced in cases dealing with a religious organization’s
hiring and firing of “ministerial employees.”165 Demkovich argued that, while this was true, the
First Amendment does not give complete immunity to religious organizations for hostile
environment claims.166 The Seventh Circuit majority agreed that the church was not free to
subject Demkovich to abuse during his employment and his claims related to his treatment could
move forward.167
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The question in this case, then, was whether the exception should apply to cases in which
there is no tangible employment action, such as hiring and firing, which The Seventh Circuit
answered in the negative.168 The court acknowledged that its decision might cause “entanglement”
issues, but explained that religious organizations’ ability to control tangible employment actions
provided protection to the organizations under the Free Exercise Clause.169 The entanglement that
may arise under the Establishment Clause could then be balanced in a way that would not allow
for complete immunity from hostile-environment cases but would also allow for religious
liberty.170
The court stated that procedural entanglements could occur when a religious
organization is subject to “legal process designed to probe the mind of the church.”171 It then
elaborated that these should not be an issue in hostile work environment claims, though, since
religious organizations have been sued by non-ministerial employees in cases like this without
issue.172
The Seventh Circuit explained that substantive entanglements happen when the
government must choose between competing religious theories. 173 This is a more difficult issue
but still does not bar these claims based on the ministerial exception. 174 To violate the
Establishment Clause, “entanglement must be ‘excessive,’” and in this case it was not.175 The
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church was free to fire the plaintiff, and the ministerial exception would have applied to that
action.176 But, the court was not looking at a tangible employment action, nor was it trying to
determine a matter of church doctrine. 177 The abuse that the court was asked to look at would be
considered abuse under neutral standards that could be enforced for non-ministerial employees
and should be available to ministerial employees as well.178
The court emphasized that the ability “to ensure that the authority to select and control
who will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is the church’s alone.’”179
Because this case does not deal with the plaintiff’s firing, it falls outside of the scope of
Hosanna-Tabor and Guadalupe, both of which specifically stated that the Court was dealing
only with the case before it and did not address challenges relating to employee treatment.180
The court acknowledged that, since the ministerial exception is judicially crafted, and
therefore a matter of constitutional law, the question is whether the “exemption is necessary under
the First Amendment.”181 The court answered an affirmative “no” in relation to the Free Exercise
Clause.182 Hostile environment claims are basically tortious, and courts recognize them as such
because the behavior that creates these environments is not essential for the control of
employees.183 The court examined the tort-law origins of hostile environment claims and how
previous cases demarcated a “line between tangible employment actions and hostile environments
to set different standards for employer liability.” 184
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The court asserted that the ministerial exception allows for religious organizations to use
tangible employment actions to control ministerial employees. It does not, however, give religious
organizations the ability to subject ministers to abuse with impunity. 185

And there is no

constitutional necessity to bar hostile work environment claims brought by ministerial
employees.186 The defense tried to assert that tangible employment actions alone did not provide
sufficient power to select and control ministers, but the court stated that hostile work environments
are “not a permissible means of exerting (constitutionally protected) ‘control’ over employees.”187
The ministerial exception exists out of constitutional necessity, but the court concluded that it is
not constitutionally necessary to allow employers to control ministerial employees using
harassment.188
As for the possibility that the harassment was based on religious doctrine, the court ruled
the conduct of a religious employee can be imputed to the church as an employer only if the church
embraced the policy as its own.189 Hosanna-Tabor did not “extend constitutional protection to
tortious conduct. Combined with the Court’s understanding of hostile work environments as
essentially tortious in nature, hostile work environment claims by ministerial employees are
allowed so long as they do not challenge tangible employment actions.” 190
The Seventh Circuit also noted that Hosanna-Tabor cemented a ministerial exception for
employers, not individual employees, as employers are the ones who take tangible employment
actions and are able to be sued under Title VII.191 This fits with the Seventh’s Circuit’s holding in
that individuals are the ones that create hostile work environments, and these harms are often
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outside the scope of employment.192 And while yes, it is important for a church to have the ability
to select its own ministers, it is equally important to allow for the protections of employees, who
are sometimes subject to terrible treatment. 193 The ministerial exception is judicially crafted based
on constitutional necessity, but there is nothing in the First Amendment to imply that employees
of religious organizations should be subject to abuse, or that religious organizations would be
exempt from all statutory protections because this behavior is not essential to a church’s ability to
control (through tangible actions) ministers.194
The court also referred to Smith, where the Supreme Court stated that it had “never held
that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” 195 As Hosanna-Tabor explicitly stated, it
did not conflict with Smith because Smith dealt with government regulation of physical acts
(which the government could do), while Hosanna-Tabor dealt with government regulation of
church decisions impacting the faith and mission of the church (which the government is not
permitted to do).196 Since the Seventh Circuit was not dealing with matters impacting the faith
and mission of the church here, the ministerial exception would not apply. Thus, statutes relating
to claims such as hostile work environment can still apply to religious organizations.197
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Id. at 729.
Id. at 731.
194 Id. at 735.
195 Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 735 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 –79 (1990)).
196 Hosanna -Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189 –90 (2012).
197 There was also a disagreement between the majority and the dissent about whether this decision was consistent
with the prior Seventh Circuit case Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago. Demkovich, 973 F.3d 718, 725
(7th Cir. 2020) (2-1 decision), vacated for rehearing en banc, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 38613 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 2020).
The majority stated that it was consistent because in Alicea, the plaintiff did not bring a hostile work environment
claim, and that she had sued the Archdiocese of Chicago for sex and national origin discriminations as well as
constructive discharge. Id. at 724. The majority stated that the question the court was presented with in Demkovich
was not present in Alicea, and that the dissent’s use of the quotation from that opinion was out of context. Id. at 72425. In Alicea, the court stated:
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The dissent, authored by Judge Flaum, strongly disagreed with this holding and stated
that he would hold “that the ministerial exception bars each of Denkovich’s employment
discrimination claims.”198 Flaum complained that the outline the majority provided to future
courts was unworkable because there was no clarification as to how to proceed when tangible
work environment claims and intangible claims overlap.199 The dissent observed that the
majority’s list of tangible employment actions was indeterminate and incomplete, and it did not
address how suits alleging these actions would trigger the ministerial exception and dismissal of
the entire claim, as Seventh Circuit did in Alicea.200
Flaum expressed the view that the ministerial exception stems from the church
autonomy doctrine, which is rooted in the religion clauses of the First Amendment, and
“prohibits civil court review of internal church disputes involving matters of faith, doctrine,
church governance and polity.”201 Therefore, he stated, “[T]he ministerial exception should bar

The question for us to answer therefore is whether Alicia -Hernandez’s position
as Hispanic Communications Manager can functionally be classified as
ministerial. Alicea -Hernandez suggests that we also need to look to the nature of
her claims and whether the discrimination in questions was exclusively secular.
Here she is mistaken. The “ministerial exception” applied without regard to the
type of claims being brought.
Id. at 724-25. This wording, the majority stated, referred to a discussion on whether there was a distinction
“between actions taken with secular motives and those with religious motives.” Id. at 725.
The dissent, authored by Judge Flaum, argued that Alicea was still controlling, and disagreed with the
majority’s view that the case did not involve a hostile work environment claim. Id. (Flaum, J., dissenting). Judge
Flaum argued that the humiliation associated with unfair working conditions met the legal standard for a hostile
work environment claim. Id at 736. Flaum also argued that because they held the “ministerial exception barred all
of the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims” in Alicea, “including her hostile work environment claim,” that
the court should follow suit here as well. Id. He claimed a plain reading on its own of the sentence from Alicea
emphasized above, that “the ‘ministerial exception,’ applied without regard to the type of claim being brought,”
should be used and that the First Amendment provided religious institutions with the ability to control ministers,
which meant that a church was able to oversee supervision, management, and communication with its ministers
without government interference. Id. at 736.
198 Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 742 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 737.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 793 (quoting Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10 th Cir. 2002).
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Demkovich’s claims not withstanding whether the Church asserts a religious justification for the
alleged conduct.”202
Judge Flaum argued that the Free Exercise Clause protects a religious organization’s
ability to control its ministers in areas including supervision, management, discipline, and
communication.203 Attempting to regulate any part of the relationship between a church and its
ministers would, in Judge Flaum’s view, infringe on a church’s free exercise rights. 204 Allowing
these claims would also threaten the free exercise rights of other churches, who may alter
ministerial relations and matters in an effort to avoid any potential litigation. 205
Judge Flaum also criticized the majority for not fully appreciating the degree of
government entanglement with religion that hostile work environment claims bring, which is
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.206 In order to analyze hostile work environment claims,
Flaum explained, courts would have to determine if the work environment within the church was
appropriate, and evaluate every step taken by the church to respond to ministerial claims. 207 This
investigation would be wholly inappropriate, and by allowing ministers and non-ministers alike
to bring these claims forward, the court is missing the entire point of the ministerial exception,
which is to allow churches complete control over who ministers to their faithful.208
While this decision has been vacated for rehearing en banc, it shows that courts are open
to the possibility that the ministerial exception may not apply to the treatment of ministers during
their employment at a religious organization.
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Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 739.
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205 Id. at 740.
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207 Id. at 740-41.
208 Id.
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The Seventh and Ninth Circuit have held that the ministerial exception does not include
all tangible employment actions.209 According to these courts’ reasoning, the ministerial
exception may not apply to suits dealing with the treatment of ministers during their employment
with a religious organization, but rather should only be applied to suits related to the hiring and
firing of these employees.210 While the author believes that this is the correct interpretation of
the doctrine, and urges the Court to follow this line of cases to help protect the rights of workers
to a safe and sustainable work environment, the Tenth Circuit, as will be discussed below, has
come to a different conclusion.
B. Circuit Split: Ministerial Exception Does Apply to Cases of Employee Treatment

The Tenth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion of the Ninth and Seventh Circuit,
and has held that cases dealing with employee treatment at religious organizations triggers the
ministerial exception.
1. Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese211
Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese was decided just a few years after Elvig, but the
Tenth Circuit reached the seemingly opposite conclusion from the Ninth Circuit. In Skrzypczak,
the court held that a minister could not bring a Title VII or Equal Pay Act claim against a church
because it would interfere with the church’s right to select and direct its ministers.212
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Compare Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (2-1 decision), vacated for
rehearing en banc, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 38613 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 2020) with Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese,
611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010).
210 Id.
211 Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010).
212 Id.
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Monica Skrzypczak was the “director of the Department of Religious Formation for the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa,” which qualified her as a minister because she had
“responsibilities that furthered the core of the spiritual mission of the Diocese.”213 She received
positive performance reviews, but was terminated. After her termination, Skrzypczak sued the
Diocese and its bishop for gender and age discrimination under Title VII, violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act, and state claims for emotional infliction
of emotional distress, and breach of contract.214
The Tenth Circuit explicitly agreed with the en banc dissent in Elvig, and stated that it was
following the precedent set by Alicea in the Seventh Circuit.215 The court articulated that allowing
hostile work environment claims would “infringe on a church’s ‘right to select, manage, and
discipline clergy free from government control and scrutiny’ by influencing it to employ ministers
that lower its exposure to liability rather than those that best ‘further religious objectives.’” 216
In dicta, however, the court agreed that churches could be held liable for tort and contract
disputes.217 The court also conceded that the church could be subject to Title VII issues as long as
employment decision did not relate to the church’s spiritual function.218 Nevertheless, the court
did not allow these claims to proceed due to concern that allowing these ministerial claims would
cause “substantive and procedural entanglement with the Church’s core functions.” 219
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Id. at 1240 & 1243.
Id. at 1241.
215 Id.at 1245.
216 Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1245. Interestinly, in Demkovich, which followed this case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly
refuted the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Alicea here and stated that it did not read the case quite so broadly.
Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (2-1 decision), vacated for rehearing en
banc, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 38613 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 2020).
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In addition, the Tenth Circuit articulated that barring these types of claims provid ed clarity
for future suits of this type and expressed worry that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Elvig would
cause confusion in its application.220 As an example of the confusion and arbitrary application of
the ministerial exception the court worried a decision like Elvig could cause, the Tenth Circuit
referenced the Ninth Circuit case of Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference, in which the
court held that “while claims for hostile work environment based on sexual harassment are not . .
. subject to the ministerial exception, claims for hostile work environment based on the failure to
accommodate a disability ‘are a part of the minister’s employment relationship with the church’”
and fall under the exception.221
The court held that because any Title VII claim will “improperly interfere with the church’s
right to select and direct its ministers free from state interference,” Skrzypczak’s claims for hostile
work environment, disparate impact because of gender, and gender discrimination were barred by
the ministerial exception.222

The Court also articulated that because activities like setting

ministerial salaries are a “matter of church administration and government,” Skrzypczak’s claims
under the Equal Pay Act were also barred by the ministerial exception.223
The Tenth Circuit, then, stands in clear opposition to the Ninth Circuit’s, and for now, the
Sevent Circuit’s, decisions relating to ministers’ rights to bring suit for issues relating to their
treatment as employees.224 The Tenth Circuit, alleging issues with entanglement, held that these
claims are barred, while the Seventh and Ninth Circuits (with the Ninth Circuit disputing the Tenth
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Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1245 (quoting Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004)).
222 Id. at 1246.
223 Id. at 1246. Because the federal claims were dismissed, the lower court was correct in dismissing the state law
claims as well because without the federal claims it did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3 ). Id.
224 Compare Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (2-1 decision), vacated for
rehearing en banc, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 38613 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 2020) with Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese,
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Circuit’s interpretation of its previous case law) have held that these claims can be brought and do
not fall under the ministerial exception. 225
IV.

The Need to Limit the Ministerial Exception with Respect to Employee Treatment
Supreme Court case law has given the ministerial exception fairly wide leeway, but upon

closer inspection, the exception can be read to apply only to religious organizations dealing with
employment claims relating to the organization’s ability select its ministers through hiring and
firing decisions. Because the treatment of ministers during their employment does not involve
hiring and firing, cases dealing with employee treatment should fall outside of the scope of the
ministerial exception. Treatment of those deemed to be “ministers” during their employment does
not deal with the right of the employer to select or control who will minister to the faithful. There
is a very fine line here, though, as to whether the claims deal with the selection and control of
ministers or the church’s ability to govern itself.
However, this leaves open the question as to whether neutral laws that deal with employee
treatment, and not selection of ministers, are barred under the ministerial exception when applied
to employees considered to be ministers. There have been very few cases dealing with this issue,
and none have come after the expansion of the ministerial exception under Guadalupe or the
additional Seventh Circuit’s decision in Demkovich. Because the ministerial exception is a
constitutional mandate, the question is whether the First Amendment bars these statutory
regulations of religious employers. If these issues were to make their way to the Supreme Court,
the Court should follow the same analysis as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and allow the cases
to proceed.
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To better examine this issue, consider the following fictional fact pattern, which will
explore the ministerial exception as it relates to the treatment of ministers in areas of law that have
not previously been discussed: specifically, federal and state laws regulating working conditions.
In exploring these areas of law, the author seeks to provide the Court with examples of possible
opportunities to limit the ministerial exception. Such laws include the Family and Medical Leave
Act, pregnancy accommodation and leave, and state sick leave laws, which if applied correctly to
ministerial employees, would help to protect rights of workers while simultaneously ensuring the
First Amendment rights of religious organizations.
This section will begin by explaining a fictional fact pattern in which a minister experiences
several issues relating to their treatment by a religious organization during their employment. It
will then explore fictional claims brought by the minister for wrongful termination, the Family
Medical Leave Act, state pregnancy accommodation claims, and state sick leave laws, to illustrate
how these laws could and should be interpreted as falling outside of the ministerial exception. New
Jersey state law is applied, but the same basic analysis should apply to state law claims in other
jurisdictions. Lastly, because the counterarguments for each claim would be similar, the
counterarguments will be addressed together in section 5.
A. Potential Application of the Ministerial Exception to Claims
This section will outline three scenarios in which a “minister” brings a claim relating to
their treatment as an employee. Scenarios like the ones below have not yet made their way to the
Supreme Court and present an opportunity for the Court to narrow the ministerial exception in a
way that protects religious organizations’ First Amendment rights while ensuring that ministers
are given protection against injurious treatment by employers.
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Ms. Davis is hired by a large religious school in New Jersey as a teacher. Both Davis and
the church agree that Davis is a minister because of the important role she plays in the formation
of religion in the minds of her students.
As part of her job responsibilities, Davis is responsible for setting up assemblies, which
requires her to carry chairs heavy tables around the school, climb ladders, and work long hours on
the nights before assemblies to ensure everything is in place. During Davis’s employment, she
becomes pregnant, is no longer able to safely perform those duties, and asks for an accommodation.
The church denies her request, despite the availability of other tasks Davis could perform and other
employees who could temporarily take over these tasks. Davis continues performing these tasks.
She is injured in performance of these duties and goes into labor early.
Later, while still employed by the school, Davis’s daughter becomes sick and requires
surgery. Davis requests unpaid time off to help with her daughter’s recovery under the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The church denies this request for a non-religious reason, and Davis’s
daughter suffers a harm because of it.
All the stress from her daughter’s illness causes Davis to get sick. Davis takes a day off
from work using sick leave. The church later refuses to pay her for this day.
Following all these actions, Davis is upset with the treatment she is receiving at work and
decides to file claims against the school alleging that it violated state sick leave, state pregnancy
accommodation laws, and committed interference under the Family and Medical Leave Act. As a
result of her suit, the school fires Davis. Davis then adds wrongful termination to her claims. None
of the decisions made by school relating to Davis’s treatment were made for doctrinal reasons.
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Each claim is broken up into its own section below. Because Davis is a minister, the
question of whether the ministerial exception applies to these claims is triggered; if Davis were
not a ministerial employee, the ministerial exception would not apply. 226
1. Davis’s Wrongful Termination Claim
Unfortunately for Davis, the case law here is clear, and because she is a minister, the church
can fire her for any reason.227 The ministerial exception was created for exactly this purpose: to
allow religious organizations absolute freedom to control who ministers to the faithful, and the
State has no power to intervene.228 Following the Supreme Court precedent set in Guadalupe and
Hosanna-Tabor, the church would be protected from this claim. 229
2. Davis’s Famile and Medical Leave Act Claim
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (hereinafter “FMLA”) was created with several
purposes in mind, including a desire to preserve family integrity and allow employees to take
reasonable leave to care for themselves or family members with medical issues while
simultaneously accommodating employers’ interests.230 There are no explicit carveouts in the
FMLA, as there are in Title VII, relating to religious entities. According to the statute, “any person
engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce that employs 50 or more employees”
serves as an employer under the FMLA.231 The FMLA also states that it “shall be unlawful for
any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right
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228 Hosanna -Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173.
229 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (2020); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186.
230 Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §2601.
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coverage limits. For example, in New York state, most private employers with more than one employee are required
to have Paid Family Leave insurance to implement the state’s Paid Family Leave policy. NEW YORK STATE PAID
FAMILY LEAVE, https://paidfamilyleave.ny.gov/employer-responsibilities-and-resources (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).
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provided under” the FMLA.232 Interference with an employee’s use of the FMLA includes “not
only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave.”233
In the case of Davis, the church’s decision not to allow her to use FMLA leave appears to
be a clear violation of the FMLA. But to establish a claim that the church interfered with her ability
to use FMLA leave, Davis would have to establish:
(1)[]she was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant
was an employer subject to the FMLA’s requirements; (3) the plaintiff
was entitled to FMLA leave; (4) the plaintiff gave notice to the
defendant of his or her intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) the
plaintiff was denied benefits to which he or she was entitled under the
FMLA.234
And unlike an FMLA claim for retaliation, an FMLA interference claim is not about
discrimination, rather it is “only about whether the employer provided the employee with the
entitlements guaranteed by the FMLA.”235 Davis’s claim, then, would center on her treatment as
an employee, and the analysis would focus on whether the ministerial exception would apply.236
In Davis’s FMLA action, the court would not be dealing with the religious institution’s
ability to control who will minister to the faithful through hiring or firing. Instead, the court would
evaluate whether the ministerial exception applies to FMLA interference claims, which center
around the treatment of the minister during employment.
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Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §2615(a)(1).
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §825.220(b).
234 Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2017).
235 Id. (quoting Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2005).
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Applying the ministerial exception to claims of FMLA interference is not necessary to
protect the church’s rights under the First Amendment. The government forcing a church to allow
its employees to take temporary leave would not interfere with the church’s ability to select its
own ministers, so it would not conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. Entanglement Clause issues
might be slightly more complicated, but would ultimately allow for the claim to be brought.
As the court noted in Demkovich, procedural entanglement is not likely to be an issue
because “religious employers have long been subject to employment discrimination suits by their
non-ministerial employees.”237 Also, as in Elvig, because these allegations involve a “purely
secular inquiry,” the court would not need to interpret any sort of religious doctrine, which also
weighs toward not applying he ministerial exception for procedural entanglement purposes.238
Substantive entanglement is slightly more difficult to determine because courts must not choose
between two or more competing religious theories, but can decide on matters relating to questions
of property, torts, or other areas of law. Here, the court would only be called upon to determine a
secular matter, as none of the factors Davis must prove are religious, and the court must therefore
determine only whether the church provided Davis the entitlements guaranteed in the FMLA. So,
the issue of substantive entanglement should weigh toward allowing the suit to move forward .
This reasoning appears to be supported in Guadalupe, which stated that the ministerial
exception was based on the insight that religious institutions must be free to select individuals who
play key roles in the institution’s central mission in order to keep “matters of church government”
independent.239

Religious organizations must still answer to some secular laws, but have

“autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s
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239 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020) (quoting Hosanna -Tabor
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central mission.”240 And while the Court stated that churches must have independence to select
and supervise ministers without State interference, it reasoned that this was because “without that
power, a wayward minister’s preaching, teaching, and counseling could contradict the church’s
tenets and lead the congregation away from the faith.” 241
Enforcing FMLA interference claims by ministers against churches would not contradict
any of these statements by the Court. Allowing employees unpaid time off to deal with family
health emergencies, as proscribed by law, would not impact or interfere with a church’s “central
mission,” nor would it interfere with the formation of the faith within the congregation.
An FMLA interference claim like Davis’s would present an opportunity for the court to
narrow the ministerial exception by finding that this case would not invoke the ministerial
exception, and that this minister would be able to bring claims for the harm she suffered by the
hands of her employer due to her treatment.
3. Davis’s Pregnancy Accommodation Claim
Pregnancy discrimination in New Jersey is covered under the state’s Law Against
Discrimination.242

Because Davis agrees she is a minister, the analysis would not center on

determining her ministerial status, but instead would center on whether the ministerial exception
would apply to pregnancy accommodation and leave laws.
As with the FMLA claim above, there is reason to believe that the ministerial exception
would not apply to pregnancy accommodation because giving an employee time off to deal with
pregnancy-related issues is not central to the mission of the church, nor does it interfere with the
church’s ability to select its ministers.
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The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination states that:
an employer of an employee who is a woman affected by pregnancy
shall make available to the employee reasonable accommodation in
the workplace, such as . . . assistance with manual labor, job
restructuring or modified work schedules, and temporary transfers
to less strenuous or hazardous work, for needs related to the
pregnancy when the employee, based on the advice of her physician,
requests the accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate
that providing the accommodation would be an undue hardship on
the business operation of the employer.243
In NJ, to prove failure to accommodate under the NJLAD,
a plaintiff is required to demonstrate: that ‘(1) [s]he is a disabled
person within the meaning of the ADA [or NJLAD]; (2) [s]he is
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job,
with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and
[3] [s]he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as
a result of the discrimination.’244
The plaintiff must also show that the employer did not engage in the participatory process
by demonstrating that (1) the employer was aware of the plaintiff’s disability; (2) the plaintiff
requested accommodations for her disability; (3) the employer failed to make a good faith effort
to help the plaintiff obtain accommodations; (4) the plaintiff could have been accommodated if
not for the employer’s failure to demonstrate good faith. 245
In Davis’s case, Davis would only need to show that the church failed to make a reasonable
accommodation in response to her request, which requires a secular analysis. Elvig is helpful here,
as like Elvig, the analysis is looking at what the church did (or did not do) in response to Davis’s
complaints, which can be subject to secular legal analysis.246 The question of whether Davis can
carry her burden of proof that she was protected by the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
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and the church did not make a good faith effort to accommodate her does not require any religious
analysis; nor does the questions of whether the church can prove an affirmative defense if she can
carry her burden. And Davis’s case is like Elvig, where the court stated that there was no First
Amendment basis for protecting the church from its d uty to protect employees from harassment
when such protection was not contradictory to the church’s doctrinal prerogatives or impact its
protected ministerial decisions (like hiring and firing).
A claim for pregnancy accommodation does not relate to hiring or firing, which are the
only type of actions the Supreme Court has explicitly held is protected by the ministerial
exception.247 This issue is complicated by the fact that courts have acknowledged that the
placement of ministers within a church is a purely ecclesiastical decision; however, that is
distinguishable here because the decision as to the placement of Davis has already been determined
and the analysis would center on Davis’s treatment by the church in regards to her pregnancy.
And as the court noted in Demkovich, a church is presumably interested in ensuring employees
perform to the best of their abilities in order to maximize the employees’ output, which allows the
employer to function at its highest potential. 248 And as the harassment the employee was subject
to in Demkovich was found to be unnecessary to control the employee because it would interfere
with the employee’s performance to an unreasonable degree, the same can be said for Davis. Not
only does refusing to accommodate her pregnancy not allow her to perform her job to the best of
her abilities, but it also puts unnecessary stress on Davis, which would impact her performance
negatively.
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Because the school’s decision not to accommodate Davis’s pregnancy is not a doctrinal
decision and does not involve a hiring or firing decision, the court could find that the ministerial
exception would not apply to this case, and should embrace this line of thinking to narrow the
ministerial exception.
4. Davis’s State Sick Leave Claim
The New Jersey Paid Sick Leave Act went into effect in 2018, and provides that all New
Jersey employers of all sizes must provide up to 40 hours of paid leave to all full or part time
employees.249 The statute also outlines how the time should begin to accrue and states that
employers will pay employees for sick leave at the same rate the employee typically earns, and
that employees shall not be required to work additional time to make up for the time they used
their sick leave.250 An employer under the Act appears to include religious institutions, as an
employer is defined as “any person, firm, business, education institution, nonprofit agency,
corporation, limited liability company or other entity that employs employees in the State,
including a temporary help service firm.”251
If Davis were to use a sick day and the church were to later refuse to pay her, the ministerial
exception should not apply. While it is true that the church can determine the wages of its ministers,
and the church is free to fire ministers with impunity, it should not be able to use the ministerial
exception to unilaterally withhold pay that a minister had otherwise earned. Here again the claim
has no impact on the church’s selection of its ministers; rather the claim is asking that the church
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fulfill its obligation to its employees under the statute. And just as with the FMLA claim above,
because Davis would only be trying to apply a statute as written, invoking the ministerial exception
must be shown to be necessary in order to protect the church’s First Amendment rights.
Here, it would not be necessary to invoke the ministerial exception to protect the church’s
First Amendment rights. As with the inquiries above, the decision to withhold earnings from an
employee who has earned them is not an action that is necessary for the church to remain
autonomous in the selection of its ministers. And a church’s decision to withhold earnings from a
minister would not help it to ensure that a minister does not preach, teach or counsel in a manner
that is contradictory to the church’s tenets, which the Court has stated is the central reason for the
church to have independence on matters “of faith and doctrine.” 252
Davis is already acting as a minister, so presumably the choice of minister has already been
set. And if the church did not want Davis to take a sick day, or thought that doing so would go
against doctrine, it could have fired her without being subject to the court’s review using the
ministerial exception. In Skrzypczak, the court referenced McClure when it held that the minister
plaintiff could not bring Equal Pay Act claims against the church because “determination of a
minister’s salary” is protected by the ministerial exception. 253 The difference here, though, is that
while the church is able to determine its ministerial wages free from court review, in Davis’s case
the court would not be determining wages. Rather, the court would be determining whether the
church is able to withhold earned wages.
A court forcing a church to pay its minister earned wages would not violate the
Establishment Clause because the entanglement would not be excessive; the court is not telling a
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church how much to pay its minister, rather it is enforcing a neutral, secular law, and would not
need to interpret or analyze any sort of doctrine to be able to do so. Forcing the church to pay a
minister previously earned wages would also not violate the Free Exercise Clause because this in
no way impacts the church’s selection of its minister.
If the Court encounters a case relating to state sick leave claims it should use the
opportunity to narrow the ministerial exception and hold that the exception does not apply to these
claims.
5. Counterargument: The Ministerial Exception Applies to All Ministerial Employment
Decisions at Religious Organizations
The counterarguments to the analysis rendered for each claim above would largely be the
same, as the claims center around the idea that because employee treatment during employment is
separate from hiring and firing, which are the only actions the Supreme Court has held to be subject
to the ministerial exception, it is possible for courts to find that these claims are not subject to the
ministerial exception.
One counterargument could be that, while the Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that
only cases relating to hiring and firing of ministers fall under the ministerial exception, so other
employment decisions, such as pregnancy accommodation, state sick leave, and FMLA claims
may fall under the exception as well. This is, as the author has noted, a plausible interpretation.
But, it is a weaker interpretation than the one outlined in this paper.
In Guadalupe, the Court notes that the ministerial exception comes from the idea that states
cannot interfere in religious institutions’ decisions regarding “matters ‘of faith and doctrine.’”254
The Court stated that it was necessary for churches to have the authority to “select, supervise, and
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if necessary, remove a minister without interference by secular authorities,” but that the purpose
of the ministerial exception was to ensure that churches are able to ensure that the “preaching,
teaching, and counseling” of its religion are consistent with the church’s beliefs.255 The Court also
articulated that this does not mean that religious employers have “a general immunity from secular
laws,” but rather, helps to “protect their autonomy with respect to internal management decisions
that are essential to the institution’s central mission.”256
Control over “preaching, teaching, and counseling” can be done through hiring and firing
processes, and so there is no need for the ministerial exception to apply to cases of employee
treatment, as outlined above. Granting employees secular rights that are protected under the law,
such as pregnancy accommodation, sick leave and FMLA leave has no relation to preaching,
teaching, or counseling, and suits relating to these types of claims require no interference in or
interpretation of religion on the part of the judicial system.
This may mean that Judge Flaum was right in his dissent in Demkovich when he proclaimed
that the majority’s decision could create a “perverse inventive for religious employers” to fire their
ministerial employees who may have claims related to their treatment, or treat them so badly that
it causes a constructive discharge, because in those cases the employer would be protected using
the ministerial exception.257 This may seem unfortunate, but religious employers can already fire
ministers for any reason, so this interpretation of the ministerial exception does not grant religious
organizations new incentives. Rather, it helps to protect employee rights while also ensuring that
the church’s First Amendment rights remain intact, with the complete ability to control the person
who ministers to their faithful.
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Davis would be barred from bringing a wrongful termination claim, as the church has
absolute power to hire and fire ministers for any reason to control who preaches to their followers.
There are areas of law, though, that have not yet been addressed fully by the Court system relating
to federal and state laws regulating working conditions. Using a fictional fact pattern to illustrate
the strongest interpretation of the law, the author showed how the Family and Medical Leave Act,
NJ state pregnancy accommodation and leave, and NJ state sick leave law should be applied to
ministerial employees. This interpretation of the ministerial exception would help to protect
workers’ rights while simultaneously ensuring the First Amendment freedoms of religious
organizations.
V.

Conclusion

The Court’s recent expansion of the ministerial exception in Guadalupe can be seen as
troubling, given the leeway that it allows to religious institutions to hire and fire those who are
deemed to be “ministers” for any reason. The Supreme Court’s holdings in the two ministerial
exception cases it has heard, though, have left room to narrow the exception by allowing cases
involving the treatment of ministers to fall outside the scope of the ministerial exception, as the
Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts have done. Cases related to employee treatment should not be
interpreted as involving religious institutions’ ability to select and control who ministers to their
faithful because the treatment occurs while the minister is employed and does not involve any
decisions relating to the “faith and doctrine” of the church. When a case relating to treatment of
ministers makes its way to the Court, the Court should take advantage of the opportunity to
narrow the ministerial exception and strengthen employment protections for ministers by hold
that the ministerial exception does not apply to employee treatment.
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